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Criminal Justice System Reform and Implementation in the Developmental State



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TEAM READINGS

Criminal Justice System Reform and Implementation in the Developmental State

Faculty

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Description

Effective criminal justice reform thinking and implementation requires deep appreciation of national contextual realities as well as meaningful adaptation of what has proven to work well across national boundaries. In this workshop we will develop an analytical framework to examine reform projects from multiple lenses: historical, sociological, institutional, legal, geographical and knowledge/data focused. We will evaluate reform as not only as a technocratic domain but equally as a political phenomenon and strategy. Informed by select international literature, our collaborative learning method will emphasize vital actual experiential insights from our diverse faculty as well as seasoned participants.

Stream Section

Criminal Justice System Reform and Implementation in the Developmental State

Berman, G., Bowen P. and Mansky A (2007). Trial and Error: Failure and Innovation in Criminal Justice Reform, National Association of Probation Executives – *Executive Exchange* pp. 7-11

Pages 1-5

Elepano, Z. N. (2009). Case Management Reform – The Philippine Experience in Livingston Armytage, *Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia-Pacific Experience*, Excerpts pp. 81, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 103, 104.

Pages 6-11

Mahapatra, D (2016) *Trials Through Video to Help Government Save Rs 100 Crore a Year*, *Economic Times*.

Page 12

Murali, K. (2006). Institutional Apathy Towards Undertrial Prisoners, *Economic and Political Weekly*, 41(37) , pp. 3936-3938.

Pages 13-16

Siddique, O. (2016). Caseflow Management in Courts in Punjab: Frameworks, Practices and Reform Measures, *Report and Recommendations to the Lahore High Court for improving Caseflow Management and Case Disposals*, European Union. pp ix.

Pages 17-18

Trebilcock, M and Daniels, R (2008). "Rethinking Rule of Law Reform Strategies" in *Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress*, Excerpts pp. 332-333, 337, 338, 352-355.

Pages 19-22

Villaveces Izquierdo, S.(2009). Building internal and external constituencies for police reform: an Indonesian case study, 12(2) *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, pp. 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191.

Pages 23-26

TRIAL AND ERROR: FAILURE AND INNOVATION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM

by

Greg Berman, Phillip Bowen, and Adam Mansky

Introduction

"Men are greedy to publish the successes of [their] efforts, but meanly shy as to publishing the failures of men. Men are ruined by this one sided practice of concealment of blunders and failures."

Abraham Lincoln

Criminal justice success stories — for example, the sustained reduction in crime in major U.S. cities during the past fifteen years — are poured over by officials from around the world in an effort to distill the lessons and replicate the accomplishments. Best practice manuals, providing protocols intended to guarantee success, are in abundant supply. At the same time, in the criminal justice world, failure is still a whispered word.

Following the burst of the dot.com bubble, failure has become a hot topic in corporate America. In fact, *Business Week* magazine devoted a recent cover story to the lessons of failure. The idea of confronting failure is not just the preserve of the private sector; from the U.S. Army to academic hospitals, other professions are learning from failure, as well. This paper seeks to extend this study into the realm of criminal justice reform.

Rather than focusing attention on well-known achievements in the field, therefore, this "red paper" — the product of semi-structured interviews with criminal justice experts, researchers and practitioners, as well as a review of the literature on failure — seeks instead to provoke debate as to why some criminal justice reforms work and some do not. This exploration is not about failures of incompetence or corruption — these kinds of failures tend to be well-documented by the media (and contribute to a generally risk-averse environment). Rather, this paper is about the kinds of failures in which well-intended efforts fall short of their objectives: the enforcement strategy that criminals ignore, the compliance monitoring scheme that doesn't reduce re-offending or the seemingly successful job training program for ex-offenders that suddenly closes up shop.

This examination is intended for anyone interested in criminal justice reform but, in particular, seeks to reach local policymakers — probation officials, court administrators, leaders of state and local criminal justice agencies. By discussing failure openly, this paper seeks to help foster an environment that promotes new thinking and the testing of new ideas. By identifying lessons that could inform criminal justice practice going forward, this paper seeks to ensure that, at the very least, tomorrow's innovators are less likely to make the same mistakes as today's. The bulk of this inquiry, therefore, looks at the causes that contribute to failure.

But there is a threshold question to ask about failure: is failure inherently good? Well, in one sense, it appears to be: Failure is a necessary by-product of innovation. The private sector, sciences and even the arts have long understood this fact; they tend to factor failure as a cost of doing business — consider the massive R&D funding by pharmaceuticals that includes substantial allow-

ance for failure. In these fields, there is acceptance that not every innovation is going to succeed. In fact, each success is typically built on the backs of numerous failures. In a sense, failure is a partner of success — and is not a bad thing.

Unfortunately, the public sector seems to have little tolerance for failure. Perhaps, as Ellen Schall, Dean of New York University's Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, has speculated, fear of failure is a by-product of the American tradition of skepticism about activist government. For whatever reason, few government agencies are known to tolerate risk; and tolerance for risk is a necessary building block for innovation.

While failure has its own merit, there are also benefits to trying to learn from it. To understand failure, it is important to analyze its causes. Two obvious causes of failure are failure of premise or concept (that is, a bad idea), and failure of implementation (that is, a poorly executed idea). While this paper does examine failures of design and implementation, it also looks at two other factors that often go unmentioned. The first is power dynamics (e.g., political influences, fiscal realities, leadership changes), which bear so heavily on an initiative's success or failure that planners ignore or discount them at their own peril. The second factor is an institution's capacity for self-analysis. The effectiveness of an innovation can be undermined or even destroyed by an organization's inability to be self-critical and open to reflection.

These latter two sources of failure — power dynamics and lack of self-analysis — do not operate in isolation, but can be seen as opposing forces in constant tension or, perhaps, flipsides of the same coin. Each must be balanced with the other in mind. On the one hand, innovators must develop concerted strategies to inoculate reform from attack, criticism and political pressures. At the same time, and as a potential by-product of such effort, a well-planned campaign to manage the powers-that-be may foster a culture that discourages transparency, self-reflection and self-criticism. As such, although this paper will open with discussion of the most obvious contributors to failure — premise and implementation — it closes by grappling with the hazards of power and lack of self-reflection.

Failure of Design

The most obvious source of initiative failure is the bad idea, the incorrect hypothesis. Sometimes, planners just plain get it wrong, anticipating — and hoping — for an impact and finding none. Why do criminal justice innovators launch initiatives with poor initial designs?

Poor understanding of target population: Discussing a project piloted twenty years ago that provided direct social services to prostitutes, Tim Murray, currently executive director of Pre-trial Services Resource Center, says "Most of our clients, about 60 in all, disappeared within the first 30 days . . . because the premise was lousy." Describing the untested assumptions the project

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made about client lifestyles, Murray believes that there were fatal mistakes in the project's design from the get-go.

Unrealistic expectations: Even when an initiative is working, it may still be damned by failing to meet expectations. The very qualities needed to build initial momentum and rally support from staff and outside stakeholders — optimism and drive — can actually lead planners to overestimate or over-promise the impact of reform. Management of expectations — whether those of agency decision-makers, stakeholders, the public or even program participants — can determine a program's success or hasten its failure. For example, Project Greenlight in New York City was a comprehensive prisoner reentry initiative that was cut short after arrest rates were found to be higher for participating prisoners than for those of two different control groups, including one that received no re-entry intervention whatsoever. In its review of the effort, the Vera Institute of Justice identified that the program had created unrealistic expectations about available social services, that participants' hopes were dashed when they accessed the services, which in turn affected their ability to successfully re-enter the community.

Unclear research guidance: Despite wide acceptance of the need for evidence-based decision-making, many areas of criminal justice remain under-researched. Even where research does exist, it may be so loaded with caveats (not to mention written in a highly technical vernacular) that it offers little guidance for policymakers. In environments demanding quick decisions, policymakers need succinct assessments and researchers willing to make the most out of the available evidence. Without clear evidence, planners must sometimes make use of educated guesses — and guesses sometimes prove wrong.

Failure to perform adequate research: Adelle Harrell, a researcher at the Urban Institute, noted that some projects will steam ahead without investing enough time delving into a problem. Sometimes in the rush to get things done, officials don't examine research and end up choosing strategies that have already been tested and rejected in other locations. Ellen Schall indicated that the criminal justice world often finds it difficult to look beyond its own arena, and ignores ideas from other fields that might be relevant.

All of these causes of poor initial design suggest that innovators need to take time with their pre-launch planning. And here is the first of several paradoxes of failure. On the one hand an innovation's premise should be well-conceived and evidence-based. At the same time, a would-be innovator can be paralyzed by the unknowable. Herb Sturz of the Open Society Institute urged innovators not to obsess about mastering all of the potential variables and instead to plow ahead — “do something.”

Sometimes, an initiative can fail to meet expectations, but produce meaningful unintended or secondary benefits; the primary objective may not be met, but the achievement of other objectives may sufficiently justify the initiative. Jeremy Travis, President of John Jay College of Criminal Justice and former director of the National Institute of Justice, highlighted this latter possibility in discussing a project he led early in his career, the Victim/Witness Assistance Project. The goal was to increase victim participation in the criminal justice system, particularly the level of victim and witness attendance in court proceedings. The original hope was that providing these services would result in significant increases

court participation by victims and witnesses. The project “failed” in terms of that measure — the level of attendance did not increase. According to Travis, “the services we provided — which were extensive, and of high quality — were not sufficient to convince victims and witnesses to increase their use of the . . . criminal justice system.”

The story did not end there, however. The project was able to rebound and to continue its experiments with mediation and placing victim advocates in the courtroom. These services were determined to be valuable on their own terms, so were retained and expanded, leading to the creation of Victim Services Agency (now Safe Horizon), one of the nation's preeminent victim support agencies.

Questions

- How can innovation be sold to skeptical audiences without creating unrealistic expectations?
- How can rational, measured planning avoid the trap of over-analysis and paralysis?
- How can researchers get their messages through to policy-makers?
- How can policymakers be better consumers of research?
- What are some of the other factors that can contribute to failure of design?
- What should innovators do in the absence of clear evidence?

Failure of Implementation

The ability of innovators to implement what are apparently sound hypotheses is fraught with potential pitfalls. An innovator can have a great idea but be unable to pull it off. Assuming that a new idea makes sense, why do some projects fail at the implementation stage?

Resources: Simple deficiencies in resources are a natural constraint on innovation, whether they be budgetary constraints, staff limitations (both in numbers or skills) or the lack of access to information or technology. There just may not be enough staff, time, money — one can fill in the blanks — to do what's needed to get a great idea up and running. Funders, whether governmental or private often have limited attention spans; sustaining new programs over the long haul is a constant challenge for would-be innovators.

Leadership: The lack of an effective leader can often be the death knell of a new initiative. Analysis suggests that the first drug courts succeeded in part because a group of committed mavericks could, by “the sheer force of personality alone . . . , overcome bureaucratic inertia and skepticism” (Fox & Wolf, 2004). Tim Murray, who helped establish the first drug court in Florida, emphasized the important role that charismatic personalities play in driving success. An effective innovator also must be an effective project manager. Ironically, the success of an innovative leader can also contribute to subsequent failure of a model project, as innovators are promoted or seek new challenges.

Commitment: Short-term demands for accountability can terminate projects before they have had sufficient time to find their feet. While it is not unreasonable for funders and senior

leaders to demand to know what is going on, innovative projects need the space to try different approaches, to adapt and move forward.

Ineffective or inadequate documentation, research or evaluation: On top of the challenge of making an idea work in practice, it is critical to be able to document accomplishments. Gathering data from the outset of operations requires significant planning, staff support (many of whom may be uncomfortable with “numbers”) and effective technology systems. Even if a research plan has been mapped out, ensuring its successful implementation may be the last thing an innovator worries about, especially in the chaos of start-up. But by not documenting impact, an initiative may be unable to justify continued funding. Jeremy Travis noted that the limitations of research create another dilemma for innovators. On the one hand, in order to document causal change the scope of the innovation must be limited and discrete. With larger and more ambitious initiatives, it may be difficult to confidently ascribe cause simply because there are so many working parts. Thus, more ambitious initiatives may be vulnerable to criticism precisely because they cannot demonstrate a direct causal impact. Does that mean that big plans are more likely to fail? They may find it harder to document success — whereas more limited efforts, with fewer variables at play, may find it harder to *achieve* success, even if they find it easier to document it.

The local landscape: Lisbeth Schorr, professor at Harvard University, said, “In my experience, the biggest mistake . . . is thinking that because a program is wonderful, the surroundings won’t destroy it when they plunk it down in a new place. But . . . context is the most likely saboteur of the spread of good innovations” (Berman & Fox, 2002). Put simply, failing to adapt to the challenges of the local context is a common cause of failure. What might work in Los Angeles might not work in a small Louisiana parish or a Midwestern city with different cultural values. At the very least, model programs will need to be tailored to local customs and political realities.

Despite the wealth of project management literature that exists to instruct innovators on how to deliver programs, translating an idea into reality is not easy. Particularly important among these challenges is ensuring that the appropriate leadership is in place to implement the reform. Equally, there remains a central conundrum once a project has started: When do we decide if a reform is working and based on what criteria?

Questions

- How do we identify, nurture and sustain the commitment of charismatic leaders? How do we innovate in their absence?
- How do we build systems that are capable of outliving initial pioneers?
- How can innovators persuade funders to allow them the time and resources to experiment and adapt over the long term?
- How do we measure the success of ambitious, multi-faceted reforms?
- How can managers balance the need to give innovators time and space with the need to pull the plug on failing programs?

- What steps can innovators take to understand the local context and adapt their ideas accordingly? How do innovators make sure that in the process of adaptation they do not alter the “active ingredient” of a model?

Failure to Manage Power Dynamics

The need to manage power dynamics and political realities surrounding an innovation is perhaps the hardest factor to discuss. (For purposes of this inquiry, “politics” and “political realities” are defined as external forces, *i.e.*, those *not* related to the merits of a project, which can affect its ability to succeed.) Criminal justice reforms can be buffeted by democratically-elected or politically-appointed officials but also by budgetary changes and everyday dynamics within bureaucracies and between agencies. Michael Jacobson and Ellen Schall, both of whom have spent time in the public and non-profit sectors, observed that non-profits may have more space for their initiatives not to succeed, whereas governmental entities have too much at stake to allow projects to fail or be perceived as failing. How do power dynamics cause failure?

Political influences: Asked why she believes that reformers sometimes attempt to implement ideas already discarded by research, Adele Harrell contends that certain programs (like boot camps) are politically appealing even when the evidence suggests that they don’t work. It is important to note, however, that political pressure is not always a bad thing. Politicians often reflect the democratic will of the citizenry. Moreover, sometimes political pressure is the only force capable of overcoming entrenched obstacles and interests.

Fiscal realities: Fiscal decisions and crisis management can alter the landscape of a reform at the drop of a hat. Today’s priority can be tomorrow’s victim of budget tightening. If an initiative appears non-essential — often the case when new programs are compared to the core business of making arrests and processing cases — it may be the first thing placed on the chopping block in a moment of crisis.

Inter-agency differences: Bureaucratic boundaries, erected by mission, staff attitudes, leadership, organizational vision and even incompatible technology systems, can produce a dynamic of its own that leads to suspicion, resentment or a lack of cooperation among agencies. These differences in agency culture could provide a serious barrier to mutual understanding and effective partnership. The Midtown Community Court’s Street Outreach Services was an attempt to partner social workers with police officers to provide instant services to New York’s homeless population. After some initial success, the project has encountered on-going challenges over time due to staff turnover at the court and the reassignment of police officers and local precinct commanders (including some not suited or committed to outreach work), leaving participating staff who were insufficiently trained in overcoming the cultural differences between the two agencies. (Street Outreach Services was also affected by the withdrawal of private foundation support — a frequent challenge that innovators must face given that very few foundations make long-term commitments.)

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Leadership and management influences: Government leaders often demand a big splash or quick win with an innovation to satisfy short-term political realities. This pressure is often at odds with developing a successful long-term reform, which typically requires evaluation and evolution over time. In fact, Wagner School's Ellen Schall, said that some organizational leaders may order the implementation of an initiative, without implementing a process to allow the existing culture to adapt to the new policy or approach. As a result, short-term gains are sometimes achieved at the expense of more meaningful long-term reform.

With some agencies, the constant churn of senior management can prove a serious obstacle to sustaining reforms. Carol Roberts, the director of community corrections in Ramsey County, Minnesota, described outlasting eight separate corrections commissioners when she worked in New York City. And change in senior leadership can lead to the scrapping of reforms simply because they are identified as belonging to a predecessor. Gordon Wasserman, former Philadelphia Police Commissioner chief of staff, suggested that it was in police chiefs' interests to downplay their predecessors' achievements. After all, if they can convince others that everything had been lousy under their predecessor, success (or at least, the perception of success) is much easier to achieve.

Politics can be both a force for good and a cause of failure. And the impact of politics is hard to predict because it is shifting in nature, subject to changing administrations, leaders and fiscal fortunes. But one point is clear: even though it may be difficult to predict, politics cannot be ignored.

Managing political forces is not something that can be improvised — it requires deliberate planning. Innovators should resist the temptation to leave politics to fate. Mike Jacobson, for example, attributed the failure of one of his major initiatives as head of New York City's Department of Probation to the lack of forethought about insulating the effort from political change — his departure as commissioner and replacement by a new commissioner not wed to his effort. Similarly, Jeremy Travis spoke of inoculating reform efforts by strategically building a broad constituency of support and expanding the definitions of success.

Questions

- Is the public willing to allow criminal justice organizations to experiment and fail with taxpayer money? Are politicians? Is the media?
- How can innovators use political forces to their benefit?
- How can policymakers fuse the political imperative to deliver change with a commitment to sound evidence-based policy?
- How can innovators manage the effects of politics at an agency-to-agency level?

Failure to Engage in Self-Reflection

While an innovator must insulate reform from political pressures, such efforts can bring about another source of failure: the lack of self-scrutiny. The ability to remain objective about performance is vital to an innovation's long-term health. Without maintaining the ability to be transparent, self-reflective and self-critical, an organization — or an initiative — can eventually

lose its focus. It is perfectly understandable for people to react strongly to negative evaluations and missed targets. However, in most cases, these evaluations can give a critical insight into a reform and provide the impetus to adapt programs, not end them.

A recent study by the Center for Court Innovation on the effects of batterer programs and judicial monitoring in domestic violence cases in the Bronx, which found that neither produced a reduction in re-arrests, is a case in point. Rather than flatly suggesting that monitoring doesn't work, the study pointed to flaws in the way that monitoring was implemented in the Bronx. The study recommended that monitoring would be more effective if based on a better application of "behavior modification" principles (e.g., involving consistent and certain responses to any infraction). In response, New York State's court system has recommended greater use of graduated sanctions for domestic violence offenders under court supervision and compliance scripts to better explain to offenders how the court will respond to noncompliance.

The Bronx study offers one example of how evaluation and reflection can lead to mid-course adjustments that strengthen reforms. Unfortunately, many criminal justice stories don't have happy endings like this one. Why do many innovators fail to engage in self-reflection?

Admitting failure: People have a natural tendency to proclaim their successes and hide their failures. Funders like successful organizations with strong track records. This can result in organizations trumpeting (and recycling) their success stories. The incentives to learn from their failures are less obvious. It can also lead to organizations continuing with initiatives which have outlived their utility. Innovations can work in a particular time and place, with particular staff, but then their time is up — staff leave, populations change — and programs are no longer as effective.

Acting on failure: Failure to recognize disappointing performance can be compounded by failure to do something about it. Herb Sturz believes projects can fail when no one pulls the plug on inadequate performance, of both individuals and programs as a whole. This failure to maintain vigilance has particular relevance where management feels a sense of loyalty to people or the project. John Feinblatt, New York City's Criminal Justice Coordinator, believes that leaders need to have the courage of their convictions if they think a project is costing too much, not producing significant results or failing to meet expectations.

The conflict between performance and learning: The need for organizations to hold staff accountable for performance is often in conflict with the desire to allow staff to experiment. Staff are rewarded for meeting agreed-upon objectives with managers, so why experiment? In *Business Week's* series on failure, one private sector consultant framed the dilemma this way: "The performance culture really is in deep conflict with the learning culture" (*Business Week*, 2006). Moreover, the kind of skills that might make someone an effective administrator — the ability to motivate, manage deadlines, juggle multiple tasks — may not be the same skill set that makes someone good at reflection.

Organizational conformity: Some agencies have internal cultures that reward conformity at the expense of experimentation. Jack

Welch, former CEO of General Electric, described GE's internal culture as 'superficial congeniality' where the contribution to the orderly and consensual conduct of business was valued more than externally measured achievements. "Facing reality was not one of the strong points . . . it . . . made candor extremely difficult to come by" (Welch & Byrne, 2001). John Feinblatt expressed the belief that it was leadership's responsibility to counter this tendency by continually asking why things were being done in the way they were.

Institutionalization leads to bureaucratization: Tim Murray believes that as soon as innovators decide to pay the 'fatal price' of concentrating on accessing funding and replicating themselves, a type of cheerleading culture is created where the job becomes *only* to have success. The creation of this type of culture leads to risk aversion and less tolerance of variation as the model is rolled out; the result is that experimentation and innovation can grind to a halt.

Adopting a self-critical stance may be central to successful long-term innovation, but the barriers to achieving this are considerable. There is a tension between accounting for performance and providing the freedom for staff and organizations to test out new ideas. There is an understandable fear that too much internal scrutiny may provide ammunition to an initiative's political foes. That said, those tensions can be creative; performance measurement can serve as a powerful motivation for leaders to change and improve.

Questions

- How do we make self-reflection a core organizational value within criminal justice agencies, as opposed to a luxury that can be easily tossed aside?
- Is the performance culture really in deep conflict with the learning culture? If so, how do we manage that conflict?
- Does innovation inevitably fail when it is institutionalized? Does institutionalizing an initiative change the definition of success and failure?
- Is it possible to protect innovators from the day-to-day pressures of managing large bureaucracies?

Conclusion

From the social problems that often underlie criminal behavior to the thousands of individual decisions that result in crimes, the criminal justice field is the product of failure itself. There is and always will be a continual need to innovate and find new ways of tackling both emerging and persistent public safety problems. This 'red paper' is merely a small step in opening discussion on the subject of failure within the criminal justice system.

The paper has identified four principal causes of failure:

- Failure of design
- Failure of implementation
- Failure to manage power dynamics
- Failure to engage in self-reflection

While the first two of these factors are self-evident, it is the interplay of the last two that is the most challenging to navigate. On the one hand, the realities of power and politics — inter-agency, budgetary or otherwise — are minefields that pose real

threats to reform and must be addressed. On the other hand, the most effective tools to combat such dangers may bring about their own challenges — namely, an unwillingness to be self-reflective.

Although it may never become a desirable outcome, failure should not be seen as the behemoth in the corner that needs to be avoided at all costs — provided that it is properly analyzed and used as a learning experience. Only by regarding failure as a partner and precursor to success will organizations become comfortable with experimentation. Only if innovators believe that they will be given the freedom to experiment, and not be punished for well-intended missteps, can the criminal justice world continue to change, evolve and improve.

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Phillip Bowen, an official with the British Home Office, spend a year "on secondment" at the Center for Court Innovation.

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Zenaida N. Elepano, *Case Management Reform - The Philippine Experience in Livingston Armytage, Searching for Success in Judicial Reform: Voices from the Asia-Pacific Experience (2009) (Excerpts) (Pages 81, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 99, 103, 104)*

1.0 Key Messages: IN adversarial litigation, parties, especially defendants and their lawyers, have been known to abuse the right of due process through procedural manoeuvring in order to delay judgment and effectively deny fair and timely justice. Since 2003, the Supreme Court of the Philippines' pilot project on case and caseflow management (CFM) for trial courts has been a ground-breaking reform in confronting this problematic situation. This project has challenged judges to assume a more activist-interventionist role in the management of cases. Through a scheme that requires strict enforcement of timelines and schedules, case events and the presentation of evidence are effectively organized and conducted in an expeditious way.

The approach principally uses caseflow management (CFM) techniques—which have been generally defined as the supervision or management of the time and events involved in the movement of a case through the court from the point of initiation to its disposition—to collapse timeframes and intervals into reasonable periods to enable a case to exit from the court with reasonable dispatch. This project has demonstrated that courts which consistently

exercise firm control and supervision over cases under the CFM process can experience faster disposition rates compared to their non-CFM case disposal performance...



... These findings indicate that CFM can work and is effective in reducing delay in the disposition of cases, *but only if the court is genuinely committed to seeing that all the events or stages of the case happen within the designated timeframes so that undue delay is averted.*



2.1: Problems and Challenges: ... Prior to 2003, the year the implementation of the Philippine Pilot Project on Case Management commenced, data from the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court (OCA) relative to trial court performance showed caseloads in the country's RTC at an unmanageable average monthly docket of 346 cases per court. The RTCs in the area selected for piloting case management had an average inflow of 268 cases per month and an outflow of only 234 cases for the year 2002. This was a good cause for raising a red flag, since courts could not even attain one twelfth an equal number of case inflow and case outflow to keep their caseloads steady. For the period of 2000 to 2002, the ninety-five first-level courts of Metro Manila had a total inflow of 82,104 cases, and a total outflow of 82,875, showing a dismal disposal of only 771 cases in three years.



Originally, case-management and CFM were thought of as the responsibility of lawyers and their clients, while judges merely refereed courtroom skirmishes. This was true of the Philippine legal situation where the manner and speed in the conduct of a court case was controlled to a great extent by lawyers.

Judges, on the other hand, allowed themselves to be passive, apathetic, and timorous actors in the adjudicative process, locked in the belief that they had no control over case input and output, case survival, and case life. This attitude was reinforced by a common fear that if judges enforced strict compliance with procedural rules and timelines, litigants would bring administrative charges for being too unfair, unreasonable, and oppressive! Also, and too often, judges found themselves at the end of an inhibition petition or a motion filed by lawyers with the OCA for change of venue of a case due to judicial partiality and bias which is mostly fictive and employed only to delay the case or to circumvent the rule against forum-shopping to get a more sympathetic court. A lot of these motions are eventually denied for lack of merit, but in the meantime, delay has already set in.

These practices have contributed, without doubt, to bursting caseloads and 'rocket' dockets. Judicial attitudes towards responsibility for case management, therefore, had to undergo a paradigm shift. Trial court judges had to be made to recognize that while a case is not yet filed and is still in the hands of the lawyer, responsibility remains with the lawyer; however once a case was filed, the case becomes the primary responsibility of the court. It was now time for the judges to step out of the judicial box, so to speak, be pro-active, and take the initiative of controlling the court environment through effective case management.



2.2.1 The Case Management Plan: In 2001, as part of its Action Programme for Judicial Reform (APJR), the Supreme Court of the Philippines (SCP) through PHILJA and the OCA, embarked on a pilot project on effective CFM as a strategy of case management for trial courts. Patterned after the American and Canadian models, the CFM Philippine version adopted as its underlying philosophy on caseflow *Standard 2.50 on Caseflow Management and Delay Reduction* formulated by the American Bar Association which states that:

From the commencement of litigation to its resolution, whether by trial or by settlement, any elapsed time other than reasonably required for pleadings, discovery and case events is unacceptable and should be eliminated. To enable just and efficient resolution of cases, the court, not the lawyers or litigants, should control the pace of litigation.

To implement the pilot project, the SCP, exercising administrative and supervisory powers over all lower courts of the country, organized a CFM committee composed of representatives from the different sectors of the justice system. The first task of the CFM Committee was to create a Technical Working Group (TWG) that would design a CFM Plan to be tested in a target area.

The CFM Plan was contained in a CFM Handbook prepared by the TWG, describing step-by-step the proposed CFM procedure for civil as well as criminal cases, consistent with the existing legal structure and rules of procedure. The CFM Committee proceeded from the premise that CFM involves reshaping rules of procedure to establish reasonable time standards, creating new case events to hasten case disposition, and eliminating events that caused unnecessary delay. It decided that since the rule-making power is vested by the Philippine Constitution in the SCP, the amendment of rules of procedure to suit CFM needs could be undertaken by the court itself, without need for intervention by Congress.

Eliminating or reducing undue delay entailed fixing reasonable time brackets for case events and their time intervals. In collapsing timelines into reasonable periods, the designers of the CFM plan were guided by the policy that time intervals between case events should be long enough to afford the parties time to prepare, but short enough to encourage them to prepare. This formula addressed the twin demand for swift disposal and fairness.

Additionally, the technique called DCM was adopted in which cases were clustered or categorized into those needing very little judicial intervention, those requiring more judicial attention; and those where ordinary judicial effort was sufficient. Fast track, complex track, and standard track processes were formulated for each case type to travel. From filing to disposition, each track had its own timeframes and case-processing requirements. The tracks would ensure that cases proceeded according to fixed deadlines.

Track assignment was determined at the time of filing or soon thereafter by the parties, their

lawyers, the judge, and the clerk of court. Parties are asked to indicate their preference in a case information sheet (CIS) which they fill out upon filing their initiatory and responsive pleadings. Ultimately, however, the determination is based on the court's and the lawyers' knowledge and experience about what level of judicial attention individual cases need. Basically, the criteria employed concerns the nature of the case, the claims and the defences, the kind of evidence to be presented, and the degree of proof required by law.

Introducing DCM to key justice sector players involved convincing them that not all cases in court are alike and therefore should not be subjected to the same time and processing schedules and needs. It was necessary to instill the idea that courts needed to abandon the 'first in—first out' policy of case handling. The traditional approach to case management simply was not working, ignoring as it did the nature, individual time, and processing requirements of each case.

The CFM Handbook described not only the tracking systems but also the particular functions of each of the key players in case management. It also contained sample forms for court orders, minutes for pre-trial proceedings, and other documents to be used by judges and clerks of courts. These proformae could be electronically generated by computer to save precious time and energy that otherwise would be spent in the manual preparation of such documents every time the need arose. These electronic forms are now considered one of the best features of the CFM system.

So that the courts could monitor the progress of cases through their assigned tracks, it was necessary to use technology. Initially, the management of data in the pilot project was to be done manually, since the project intended only to show that CFM worked as a strategy for delay reduction or elimination. During the CFM training programme, however, vital issues arose including the need for accuracy in monitoring case progress through the tracks as well as strict observance of pre-trial and trial events. Both were matters that could very well be solved with the help of automation.



2.3.1 Problems Encountered and Modes of Resolution: As in any experimental endeavour, the CFM pilot project had its share of roadblocks that needed to be cleared as soon as these appeared.

Resistance to the changes being introduced was discernible at the training programme and while the activity was underway. Judges and court personnel, especially the older ones mothballed in traditional slow-paced litigation, found difficulty in adjusting to, and keeping in step with, the new timeframes and schedules, as these entailed major changes in their work environment. They feared that gone would be the days when time was fully theirs and not circumscribed by rigid rules. This would upset the pattern of their professional and personal lifestyles. As a result, monitoring by the judges and clerks of courts became lax, and timelines were often ignored. Was the Filipino trait of '*ningas cogon*' already rearing its ugly

head?



Within the pilot period of two years, a significant number of judges and court personnel ceased to be connected with the courts due to generally unforeseen causes like promotions, resignations, early retirement or deaths (no, not because of CFM)! The replacements, especially those temporarily designated to take over vacancies, found it difficult to adjust to the CFM process because of lack of sufficient motivation and training, especially in the operation and management of the CFM software. Technology-wise, when computers bogged down or crashed, users did not know what to do, and technical assistance was slow in coming.



At end of the experiment, the courts did a self-assessment of their performance. At the level of the MeTC, 95 per cent of the CFM civil cases and 90 per cent of CFM criminal cases were disposed of according to their designated timeframes, disposals here being measured in terms of full-blown trials. At the RTC level, the disposal rate was a disappointing 23.5 per cent on the average for both civil and criminal cases. This could perhaps be attributed to the fact that some courts failed to strictly observe time limits due to disinterest, insufficient technical know-how, and unexpected vacancies that were not immediately filled. All of which ultimately resulted in failure of the monitoring process.

These findings nevertheless confirmed that CFM works and is effective in reducing delay in the disposition of cases, *but only if the court is genuinely committed to seeing that all the events or stages of the case happen within the designated timeframes so that undue delay is averted*. An additional but equally important finding was that the full support for the process by the SCP, the trial courts—judges as well as court personnel, the Bar and all other stakeholders is intrinsic to the success of any case management plan.



Furthermore, several important issues—drawn from this pilot project after dissection and analysis—were resolved into the following lessons learned:

1) The design of a successful case management programme should consider the following essentials:

A policy statement or a statement of purpose for the case management plan that serves as lodestar. Without a mission statement, the endeavour will be directionless with no specific goals to be achieved.

Firm judicial leadership—Judicial leadership involves more than just taking the lead in managing one's own court and pushing cases up to final disposition. A high degree of moral ascendancy or authority is demanded. This arises out of a legitimate cause and impels others in the litigation system to be morally obliged to accept and respect such authority, to be led, to follow, and to cooperate. Good leadership recognizes participatory management. It instils in the players a sense of ownership in the programme and empowers them to engage in a lively and frank exchange of ideas and concerns because they have a valuable stake in it.

An environmental scan of the existing legal structure—A review of statutes and rules of procedure

that allow or inhibit implementation is imperative. In this way, parameters of the case management structure can be determined, including what can or cannot be done; legal barriers that may be pushed beyond perceived limits; or legislative action necessary to implement a process.

An analysis of *the legal culture*, namely, the readiness and willingness of the justice stakeholders to accept and adjust to the changes brought about by case management reforms. This also refers to the attitudes, the needs of, and relationships between, the local Bench and Bar.

The identification of key persons who are to be involved in the project and the description and delineation of their individual roles in the planning and implementation. This 104 SEARCHING FOR SUCCESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM ensures sustainability in terms of commitment to bring the programme to its desired result. • An inventory of existing management information systems to determine the availability or viability of the infrastructure, if any. • The level of support/cooperation of the local government unit officials. • Sustainability in terms of logistics for system maintenance, continuity of training programmes, and other related administrative concerns.

Trials through video to help government save Rs 100 crore a year

By [Dhananjay Mahapatra](#), TNN | Updated: Mar 28, 2016, 12.14 PM IST

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NEW DELHI: Nearly three lakh undertrial prisoners in jails are transported regularly to the courts to face trial which entails arranging for transport vehicle, escort vehicle, police personnel for security, their lodging in the court and taking them back to [jail](#) safely.

When an undertrial gets produced in court thrice a year it costs the government Rs 1,000. But now, undertrials need not be produced in courts as trial court proceedings can go ahead through video conferencing, which will help the government save Rs 100 crores per year. The facility is being installed at almost all district courts through the eProject piloted by the Supreme Court's eCommittee headed by Justice Madan Lokur.

Trial through video conferencing from jail would eliminate the incidents of brawls involving undertrials inside the jail van taking them to court, which had some times turned fatal for few of them. It would also rule out the chance of prisoners escaping.

The eCommittee in consultation with the high courts had selected 830 locations where video conferencing facilities were to be installed. By March 1, the facilities have been installed in 669 locations, that is in over 80% places the video conferencing facility was ready for use.

[Chhattisgarh](#) HC had chosen the highest number of locations — 115 — for installation of video conferencing facilities, of which installation has been completed in 98 places.

Odisha had identified 85 locations, of which 83 already have video conferencing facilities. Maharashtra too had the facilities installed in 72 of 76 places.

Apart from video conferencing facilities, the eProject has ensured that litigants do not need to pay a fee to their advocate anymore to find out when would their case be listed again. SMS services have been started in many courts, which alert litigants about the next date of hearing soon after an adjournment.

In India there are 1,387 jails housing 4.18 lakh prisoners of which 2.82 lakh are undertrials.

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Chhattisgarh HC had chosen the highest number of locations — 115 — for installation of video conferencing facilities, of which installation has been completed in 98 places.

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Institutional Apathy towards Undertrial Prisoners

Author(s): K. Murali

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from the point of view of whether it will help the country move faster towards a knowledge-based society, whether the changes will help young graduates, including those from weaker sections of the society, prepare for the competitive world that awaits them. The changes that the new reservation rules will bring about are not likely to further these objectives. The steps that are urgently needed are can easily be listed. They are: (i) universal primary education; (ii) better quality education at all levels by at the very least improving the teacher-student ratio, (reports say that in parts of Bihar, there are 130 students to a teacher); (iii) improving the Navodaya school system and starting many schools that will fulfil the aspirations of talented students and bring out their best; (iv) organising a vigorous programme at all levels of school and college education to spot potentially good students with scholastic aptitudes; (v) organising special programmes for all students coming from disadvantaged background, to prepare them, with financial support when needed, to compete with any and all students and realise their true potential; (vi) massive expansion of quality education at higher levels, without compromising the quality, keeping in mind that one factor in keeping the quality high has always been the spirit of open competition among the students. The Peoples' Republic of China, practical as always, has already identified about 150 institutes of higher education for their development to bring them up to world-class standards in a decade.

The course of action outlined here presupposes long years of unglamorous hard work. It is not a populist measure, nor will it help maintain the present grip of casteiest vote bank system that has become dominant in politics in India in the past couple of decades. In fact, with luck, such a course of action may reduce the effect of caste-based and communal politics by pushing the society towards quicker homogenisation. The government, all political parties without exception and even the educational pundits are totally silent on the points raised here. Indeed, they have given no serious thought to these or similar proposals, nor have they made any noteworthy move in these directions. This is as true of the parties considered communal and pro-capitalists as of those labelled as secular and socialist. One wonders why? [17]

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ANDHRA PRADESH

Institutional Apathy towards Undertrial Prisoners

A study of prison conditions in Andhra Pradesh undertaken by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative reveals the denial of legal assistance to prisoners which has ultimately led to overcrowding, unacceptable overstretching of facilities and consequent terrible conditions.

K MURALI

Recently, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative has undertaken a study of prison conditions in Andhra Pradesh. The study reveals, among other things, many problems faced by the undertrial prisoners. The most important problem is the denial of legal assistance to prisoners that has led to chronic overcrowding, unacceptable overstretching of facilities and consequent terrible conditions in which mostly unconvicted persons must spend an unjustifiably long duration incarcerated without proof of guilt. These problems are not intractable or inevitable. They are to a large extent the result of institutional apathy, neglect of statutory duties, regulations and norms and, indeed, disregard of the law and directions of the Supreme Court and high court.

The population of undertrial prisoners has been steadily increasing in Andhra Pradesh for the past few years. In the past five years, from 2000 to 2005, the number of undertrials admitted into prisons per year has gone up from 1,41,641 to 1,55,363. Annually, the number of undertrial prisoners is increasing at a rate of 2.4 per cent. At 2005, 65 per cent of the entire prison population was made up of people awaiting trial. The ratio between total number of convicts and the undertrials admitted into prisons is 1:9.

While reasons for increasing undertrial population may range from increased police effectiveness in apprehending criminals or unnecessary arrests, refusal of bails, non-availability of escorts, injudicious usage of videoconferencing to extend remand periods, ineffective hearings or other prosecution and judicial delays, the situation of overcrowding and

unjust incarcerations can be significantly improved through better implementation of the right to have an effective legal representation.

Denial of Free Legal Aid

Though all prison officials like to claim that every undertrial prisoner was promptly provided free legal aid or a 'sarkari vakeel', in reality one can see number of them without any kind of legal assistance. We observed that only some of the prisons held printed legal aid application forms that are used for seeking legal aid. We also observed that information about legal aid was normally passed on to newcomers by older hands who had got to know about it but it did not come from any official.

During our interaction with undertrials, especially the new ones, it took us some time to explain that there is a system called free legal aid through which they could get legal representation for free. Many could not grasp the concept immediately or believe that they are entitled to an effective representation as a matter of right. As there is no system of formal induction for new prisoners, there is no systematic way of providing new entrants with information about availability of free legal aid as a matter of routine. Most prisons do have wall writings indicating that free legal aid is available. However, given that 48 per cent of all undertrials are absolute illiterates and 35 per cent are semi-literates,¹ the value of wall writings is at best limited to a very few assiduous readers; others simply don't have any way of knowing unless they get a chance on the information. Since the visits to jail by lawyers are also infrequent and irregular there is little opportunity to come by information

through the familiar sight of regularly visiting lawyers.

In fact, in some prisons the officials promptly process the requests for legal aid. But it is done in more a casual manner rather than effectively useful to the accused. Even where officials casually forward requests by the undertrials for legal aid and receive intimation from concerned magistrates that a particular lawyer has been appointed as a defence counsel, the accused are very often not aware of it because the fact is not promptly told to them. As well, legal aid counsels do not themselves make it a point to visit or proactively approach the families of undertrial prisoners or inform them regularly about the progress of the case, undertrials remain under the impression that they are not being provided legal aid. Since there is no system that explains to the accused that standing legal aid counsel in the court is supposed to represent them when they are produced before the magistrate they certainly do not know that there is any standard expected from their lawyer or any of their rights in relation to getting good service from counsel.

In some of the cases that came to our notice undertrials are under the impression that they have to pay to the legal aid counsels. The lack of progress in the cases, and non-appearance of the legal counsel in the prison and court reinforce the impression that without payment service cannot be insisted upon or even expected. In some districts, for instance, in Karimnagar and Nellore, we were given strong indications by those we interviewed that the undertrial prisoners are sent strong signals that they are expected to pay a fee to legal services counsel.

Poor Legal Representation

The videoconferencing has been introduced as a means of dealing with lack of escorts and cutting down on time taken in toing and froing from court. However, now there is a need for a fresh look at the functioning of legal aid in the context of increasing usage of the videoconferencing system existing between courts and prisons. At present the videoconferencing is routinely used merely to extend remand periods of undertrials. In court, counsel would be present. However, it has become the habit for there to be no counsel present at the videoconferenced hearing.

We did not witness a single instance in videoconference rooms of any courts in the state, where either defence counsels or legal aid counsels were present when extensions for remand were being decided. While the presence of legal aid counsels is specifically insisted upon when the accused is physically produced before the magistrate, like in Mahaboobnagar, in the subsequent hearings, it is not the same with the case of videoconference proceedings. The absence of legal aid counsel during the remand extension hearings can be a ground for removal of such counsels from empanelment of legal aid system. The demand for money, absence during remand extensions and negligence of duties by the counsels are all contrary to the guidelines issued by the state legal services authority (SLSA) of Andhra Pradesh.²

Documentary evidence of specific instance of non-availability of legal aid bears out our experiences and observations. As on December 25, 2004, there were 936 undertrial prisoners in Andhra Pradesh, who had completed more than one year behind bars. Of them 78 undertrials did not file a bail petition, the prison records say, for want of advocates. It is important to note that in almost all these cases, the police did not even bother to file charge-sheets. After 90 days the prisoners would have been near automatically entitled to bail, if legal aid counsel was made available and charge-sheets were filed in all these cases as per the judgment of Supreme Court.³

The absence of strong monitoring systems to gauge the performance of the legal counsels appointed to each court is one main cause of the neglectful service provided. Another important reason for poor legal representation is the lack of information to the accused and his/her family about the particular counsel that has been designated to represent the case and the standards and services that the client is entitled to expect. Since even the orders from magistrates to prison officials informing them of allotment of counsels remain in English, remand prisoners are at the mercy of prison authorities for that information. This need of the accused is met by recent guidelines issued by the SLSA of Andhra Pradesh to display information of legal aid counsels at the courts in Telugu. To make it more effective, there is a need to display complete information about all the legal aid counsels in and outside of the prison

premises also to which the family members of accused frequent. At present the boards in prisons merely say that legal aid is available but do not specify the details. It is also necessary to maintain an attendance register even in videoconference rooms in each court to ensure the attendance of legal aid counsels. Some mechanism should be set up to review the performance of the appointed counsels periodically by magistrates by visiting prisons once in a month. This is to ensure that magistrates' orders providing legal aid are honoured in letter and spirit by the legal counsels. There is a need for setting up of legal aid cells in all the prisons to bring awareness among the inmates on the legal aid services and their standards they can expect from legal aid counsels. There is also an urgent need to set up a mechanism to monitor the functioning of the legal aid counsels in this regard and reiterate guidelines along with the consequences that can follow for non-compliance. Without firm standards there is no incentive to perform according to the codes of practice espoused by the profession.

Lack of Escort

A major reason for long overstays in prison is non-production of the accused in court because of non-availability of an escort force. The government figures put the production rate at more than 85 per cent. But this indicates the overall average and does not take an account of particular segments, which are particularly badly affected by the alleged lack of escort. Women account for 5.6 per cent of the total prison population on any day in a year, but they constitute 13 per cent of total number of admissions throughout 2004-05. They are housed in all prisons primarily meant for men as well as in the state jail for women in Hyderabad and Rajahmundry. They come from several districts to these limited facilities. The police of East Godavari and Hyderabad have to provide female escorts and produce the women undertrials in courts situated outside those districts. There is a shortage of female escorts here as well as in other districts where women are confined.⁴ Therefore, women prisoners more than their male counterparts are likely to miss hearings and have their stays routinely extended.

Another badly affected group come from amongst undertrials housed in sub-jails.

These problems show up more in the sub-jails of Rayalaseema region, but not exclusively.⁵ The district level undertrial review committee of Mahaboobnagar,⁶ pointed to the many cases pending before various courts in the district for want of production before the courts. At the end of year, there were 13 accused involved in eight cases in jails for more than one year. There were also 32 accused involved in 28 cases in jails of the district for more than six months. As on June 30, 2004, in Hyderabad and Secunderabad jurisdictions, there were 93 undertrial prisoners awaiting trial for more than one year and 96 were for more than six months. The district level review committee of Hyderabad⁷ points out that these cases are pending because police fails to execute non-bailable warrants and does not file charge-sheets for years together.

The instances and situations have been observed in the course of visits over seven months to 20 jails across 16 districts of the state. There is no reason to believe that the situation is better in any particular district, or that these instances are not typical of the system, which can with a little coordination and oversight work far better and significantly reduce both the rights violations implicit in lack of attention to these matters and the acceptance by oversight bodies of poor practices. The poor condition of service in the prisons and in statutory authorities like the legal aid service does little to help the situation. However, this cannot be a reason for abjuring responsibility for providing regular services to the client group created by law or reduce the level of duty owed to the indigent prisoner. Similarly, in relation to lack of escort, it is the duty of the state to ensure that citizens are afforded every opportunity to be present at court and that the routinised practice of returning a warrant for appearance in court to the authorities with the comment that an extension for hearing be granted because there is no escort is to be deplored. This amounts to the prison/police authorities who are third parties to the case between state and citizen interfering in the process and amounts to a violation of the standards of fair trial. Such practice cannot be condoned.

If courts do not tolerate such routinised means of retaining prisoners in jail for unfair and overlong period across the state, means will be found to remedy the situation, which now prevails. One solution lies in ensuring that undertrials are housed

in jails closer to the courts in which their trials are pending and another necessary requirement is that each authority involved in ensuring an appearance including the legal aid counsel, the prison and the police escort responsible for producing the accused in court be required to coordinate so that the prisoner is not required to spend more time in jail than is absolutely unavoidable and so that fair trial guarantees are not defeated. That stringent adherence to these requirements will have the long-term effect of easing the chronic overcrowding in Andhra jails as well and send a salutary signal to all the authorities concerned in regard to their individual duties to produce the accused in court and not compromise the freedom of citizens for want of proper systems. [27]

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Notes

[The writer is grateful to Maja Daruwala, director of Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) for generous comments on the draft.]

1 National Crime Records Bureau, ministry of home affairs, government of India, 2002.

2 1 Legal Aid Counsel should give legal assistance to the persons in custody, for opposing remand applications, for filing bail applications and moving miscellaneous applications as may be required.

2 Legal Aid Counsel is under obligation to remain present, in the court assigned to him/her, during remand hour and such other hours as may be directed by the courts concerned.

3 Common Cause, a Registered Society vs Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1619.

4 Proceedings of the *High Level Committee on Production of Remand Prisoners in Courts*, January 20, 2005.

5 The average figures of prisoners are always very deceptive. The annual inflow and outflow of undertrial prisoners from sub-jails is more than 73,000 but authorised capacity of 120 sub-jails is 3,175. If we go by averages as on March 31, 2005, for instance, the sub-jails of Chittoor district are housing 37 per cent more undertrials than the authorised accommodation. Similarly, the central prison of Kadapa and district prison of Mahaboobnagar were housing 94 per cent and 258 per cent of more than their authorised accommodations.

6 Dated November 15, 2004.

7 Dated August 21, 2004.

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Osama Siddique, Caseflow Management in Courts in Punjab: Frameworks, Practices and Reform Measures: (Report and Recommendations to the Lahore High Court for improving Caseflow Management and Case Disposals) (European Union: 2016)

Executive Summary: Caseflow Management – The International Experience

Delay, case pendency and caseload reduction have received particular attention by the Pakistani judicial leadership, especially over the past decade and a half. Various initiatives have been undertaken in this regard and some headway made. However, they remain perennial challenges, as evidenced by various past and recent scholarly reports, third-party assessments and public perception surveys. This points to the continuing need for meaningful large-scale structural reforms, modernization of laws and processes, and fresh approaches to improving administration of justice.

- **Section 1** of this Report maps and discusses international reform experience that demonstrates that merely boosting judicial and court resources, incremental legal and procedural modifications, and automation of certain aspects of the legal process, offer limited assistance towards promotion of sustainable efficiency and predictability in legal processes and effective on-going management of delays and case backlog.
- Instead, there is now considerable evidence to show that the reform focus ought to be on scientifically measuring, tracking, monitoring and streamlining case processing times and judicial workloads as well as on meaningful identification and control of resilient barriers to effective case processing.
- In this context, there is now a vast, fast growing and deep literature on

various aspects of Caseflow Management that has evolved into an advanced domain of specialized thinking and practice. A close review of this literature reveals certain core purposes, vital characteristics and prominent aspects of Caseflow Management on which there is a general academic, policy-maker and practitioners' consensus amongst those who study, analyze and operate in this area.

- The upshot is that an effective, comprehensive, contextualized and dynamic Caseflow Management system is now widely believed to be the fundamental discipline, approach and mechanism required to ensure judicial independence, the administrative control of judges over litigation, and the efficient, effective and fair administration of justice.
- Closely connected to this idea is the conviction that in order to enable just and efficient resolution of cases, it is the court, and not the lawyers or litigants, who should control the pace of litigation and thus meaningfully monitor and address the problems of delay and backlog.
- Since courts are expected to play a pivotal role it is also deemed necessary that the judicial leadership must assume primary responsibility for the pace of litigation and that judges must be the formal leaders of any reform efforts.
- Caseflow Management involves (but is not limited to) the entire set of actions that a court takes to monitor and supervise the progress of cases, from initiation to conclusion, including organization and management of daily dockets, setting calendars and time standards, establishing case processing tracks, management of individual cases, management of the court's overall pending caseload, vision- setting and strategic planning, budgeting and resource utilization, and overall judicial policymaking, goal-setting and leadership.
- This Report sets out to examine the current state of Caseflow Management in Punjab by focusing on the following three important and inter-connected areas: (1) Actual pace of litigation in the district courts of certain selected districts and the impediments to efficient administration of justice; (2) The current legal framework for Caseflow Management in the province; and (3) The administrative edifice, personnel and processes at the Lahore High Court ('LHC') as well as in the districts for conducting and monitoring Caseflow Management in the districts.



Michael Trebilcock and Ronald Daniels, “*Rethinking Rule of Law Reform Strategies*” in *Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress* (2008) (Excerpts) (Pages 332-333, 337, 338, 352-355)

10. Rethinking rule of law reform strategies

INTRODUCTION: In this book we have made two parallel and mutually reinforcing claims. First, we have proceeded on the premise that, on a sufficiently parsimonious definition, the rule of law is a universal good tied inextricably to development. In making this claim, we have not supposed any particular form of political organization, economic philosophy, or even legal culture. Rather than engaging in the details of substantive law, we have therefore focused on the institutional structures responsible for administering the rule of law. At the same time, however, we have declined to accept the view that obedience to a given set of rules – the rule of rules or rule by law – is a normatively defensible conception of the rule of law. In order to infuse a normative basis into our institutional approach to the rule of law, we have elaborated a set of *procedural values* central to any effective, institutional approach to the rule of law. Broadly, these values encompass process values (transparency, predictability, enforceability, stability), institutional values (independence, accountability), and legitimacy values. We have then identified a set of institutions which constitute essential elements of the rule of law. Drawing wherever possible on international consensus we have, in the context of each institution, elaborated a set of structural conditions reflective of these core procedural values, although we freely acknowledge that particular institutional entailments or instantiations of the rule of law will be shaped by normative considerations particular to given social, historical, cultural and legal contexts (as is true also of developed countries).

Second, observing that states have had difficulty implementing even this baseline institutional structure, we have hypothesized that three classes of impediments – resource constraints, social/cultural/historical values, and political economy – are responsible for the relative failure of many rule of law reform initiatives to date. The boundaries between these three classes are not always sharp, and indeed in some circumstances, seemingly unitary factors can be cast in terms of two, or even all three, categories. Nevertheless, this typology is useful for two reasons. First, our empirical research has established beyond doubt, across institutional structures and geographic regions, that each of these three classes of impediment to reform has some role to play. Second, as we attempt to elaborate in greater detail below, we believe that conceiving of impediments to rule of law reform in this manner can help focus the international reform community, in terms of both the goals of rule of law reform and the methods appropriate to achieving those goals.

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More generally, given the wide variety of institutional arrangements observable even in developed countries that seek to vindicate or instantiate rule of law values, it would be both presumptuous and counterproductive for the international community to attempt to

proselytize, let alone impose, some external blueprint of the rule of law paradigm – even a relatively parsimonious, procedurally-oriented conception of the rule of law such as we have espoused – on developing countries, each with their distinctive, social, historical, cultural and legal traditions and norms. Thus, the international community, before seeking to promote specific or concrete rule of law reform initiatives in developing countries, needs to seek firm evidence of domestic “ownership” of such initiatives reflecting the support of a broadly representative range of domestic constituencies, even though often not constituting, for various reasons canvassed below, a winning or decisive political coalition.

However, we would emphasize that sensitivity to particularities of context should not be elided with a radical relativism, nihilism or the naturalistic fallacy wherein the “is” becomes the “ought” and hence an excuse for policy paralysis. A major advantage of the relatively thin conception of the rule of law that we have adopted is that it would seem to be a necessary albeit not sufficient basis for any of a range of substantive conceptions of the rule of law or justice more broadly, and hence compatible with substantial forms of legal pluralism. Moreover, in our review of each of the major classes of legal institutions in this book, we have sought, wherever possible, to invoke as our normative benchmarks precepts endorsed in international covenants, codes, agreements and guidelines that have attracted broad consensus from many countries, developed and developing, hence seeking to minimize concerns that the benchmarks we employ reflect an externally imposed, ethnocentric conception of the rule of law.

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We would add a fifth and related process lesson: it will often be appropriate for developing countries contemplating rule of law reforms to look for reference points not to developed countries primarily but to other developing countries with substantial affinities to the country in question who have achieved significant successes in the relevant domain (like Costa Rica and Uruguay in Latin America; Botswana and South Africa in Africa; Hong Kong and Singapore in Asia.)

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V. REFORM STRATEGIES IN POLITICAL CONTEXT: Given the relative strengths of these various forms of political pressure, we offer a tentative range of conclusions about the role of the international community in rule of law reform. As we move along the spectrum from Type I states to Type III states, top-down, state-centric reform strategies become less feasible, and bottom- up, community-based reform strategies become a more promising option.

Type I states In these states, where broad political and popular support for rule of law reform exists, the role of the international community should be focused most heavily on alleviating resource constraints. While sociocultural factors and various forms of vested interests may still act as important barriers to reform, in these states it will be domestic governments, rather than the international community, who will be best placed to address these concerns.

We think this point is self-evident with regard to sociocultural values, but it should apply equally to lower level corruption.

The preferred method of intervention in the most favourable cases (admittedly rare) should be unconditional aid, leaving to the domestic government concerned choice of reform priorities and strategies and sources of technical advice unless for credible commitment and signaling purposes the recipient government requests conditionality. Domestic political support for rule of law reforms, by assumption strong in Type I states, is perhaps the most important success factor of unconditional or conditional aid. The “mallet”-like political pressure of accession mechanisms will play little fruitful role, because the state is already generally politically aligned with the viewpoint of reformers. Similarly, because trade policy does not direct new resources to rule of law initiatives, it will be irrelevant in these circumstances. Due to their punitive nature, sanctions would be entirely misplaced.

While making the case for conditional aid in more equivocal cases, however, it is important to emphasize again that government policy may be fluid, and that strongly pro-reform administrations can shift policies quickly, particularly where they come to power in a period of transition or during a key “constitutional moment.” Donors must therefore be vigilant in monitoring the trajectory of Type I governments – and enforcing conditions where appropriate – an historical weakness of development agencies. Lessons can be drawn, for instance, from the experience of the World Bank with the government of Alberto Fujimori of Peru in the mid-1990s, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 (judicial reform). Funding of non-state drivers of rule of law reform such as local NGOs can also play a role in these states, as they can in almost any situation. However, in these cases, NGOs that cooperate with, rather than oppose government policies, are likely to be more effective.

Type II states In states with generally reform-minded political leadership but with a less secure political base and widespread opposition from vested interests within state agencies, including legal institutions and perhaps private sector parties who benefit from dysfunctional public institutions, a more diverse set of strategies will be necessary. In these cases, resources may still be scarce, but international agencies or external donors cannot responsibly commit to unconditional aid. Even where high-level political leadership supports reform, increased aid flows to antagonistic public or legal institutions can be misdirected and wasted or used for regressive purposes. With respect to conditional aid, as we noted above governments truly committed to reform may agree to conditional aid that binds them to a policy and protects them from internal special interests. A case can be made for conditionality through accession or trade preferences on similar grounds. Also, there may be a good case for non-state-led reforms through local NGOs or Alternative Law Groups operating more independently from the state in institutional contexts where independence of legal institutions is likely to be problematic.

Type III states Our discussion of international policy mechanisms suggests that governments

unequivocally opposed to rule of law reform will rarely be sensitive to state-level pressure mechanisms, a point made both in the context of sanctions and all forms of conditionality. As Preeg argues in respect of US sanctions (e.g. denial of MFN trading status) against China, “the basic reason why these unilateral economic sanctions are ineffective is that the foreign policy objective is to change the oppressive behaviour of an authoritarian or totalitarian government, which constitutes a direct threat to its control if not survival.” While China is not our test case – US sanctions in this case were intended to stimulate democracy more than the rule of law – the point remains the same.

In these cases, the role of non-state actors should become a central aspect of rule of law reform efforts, with a particular focus on those local and international NGOs developing reforms independent of state agencies and the provision of financial and technical assistance to them. In China and Laos, NGOs have played an important role as *de facto* monitoring mechanisms for correctional institutions where the state has denied access to formal state-level monitoring channels. Properly designed and implemented non-state dispute resolution mechanisms, often based on traditional forms of community-based dispute settlement, can also be a vital element of access to justice in circumstances where courts suffer from chronic backlog, corruption or bias and hence a lack of legitimacy.

It will be obvious that over time states may evolve either negatively or positively from one stylized type to another in our foregoing typology, requiring the international community continuously to reassess its rule of law reform promotion strategies and to readjust its menu of strategies accordingly. However, even acknowledging this, and acknowledging further that all desirable rule of law reforms cannot be realistically embarked upon simultaneously, if only because of resource constraints and pressing demands on those resources, even in the most favourable (Type I) political environments issues of prioritization and sequencing will invariably arise. While these must largely be resolved by domestic constituencies committed to rule of law reform, as must the particular forms of institutional vindication or instantiation of rule of law values, nurturing an increasingly robust domestic constituency for the rule of law over time requires that a broadly representative range of social, economic and political interests come to see their interests and values as aligned with the promotion and preservation of the rule of law. In this respect, we question (along with others) the aptness of the relatively high priority often accorded to formal judicial reform by the international community in the rule of law reform initiatives that it has promoted in developing countries in recent years and the relative lack of attention to reforms that are more likely to affect the day-to-day interactions of the citizenry with the legal system – police, prosecutors, specialized law enforcement and administrative agencies (such as tax administration), access to justice initiatives such as informal community-based dispute resolution mechanisms (often reflecting adaptations to and elaborations of traditional dispute settlement mechanisms), and Alternative Law Groups, where more visible and immediate material benefits from successful institutional reform are likely to be experienced by a wide cross-section of the citizenry.

Santiago Villaveces Izquierdo, *Building internal and external constituencies for police reform: an Indonesian case study*, 12(2) International Journal of Police Science and Management (2009) (Excerpts) (Pages 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191)

BACKGROUND

After their separation from the Indonesian Armed Forces in 1999, the Indonesian National Police (INP) have been on the path of reform from a military organisation towards a modern police service. The first indication of such a movement came with the publication in 1999 of what is known, within police circles of the country, as *buku biru* (the blue book). By outlining the basic direction for police reform in Indonesia, the *buku biru* identifies the challenges that need to be overcome in order for the police to effectively move from a military orientation to a community service orientation. All major institutionally grown reform directives since 1999 still use the *buku biru* as their primary reference point and conceptual framework. The INP want to project reform efforts as a progression that responds to the three critical challenges that have been identified as pillars for change since 1999: the instrumental challenge, the structural challenge and the cultural challenge.

The response to the *instrumental challenge* includes the development of an institutional philosophy (mission, vision, objectives), which basically reaffirms that the responsibilities of the police are to respond to the community and maintain security by upholding the law and respecting human rights. These principles were incorporated into the National Police Act (Law 2, 2002). The

response to the *structural challenge* is two-pronged. It entails, on the one hand, organisational changes (ie, delegation of more authority and power to the regional, district, and subdistrict levels and reduction in levels of bureaucracy to enable more effective decision-making and improved service to the community). On the other hand, the response includes consolidating the INP's position as an autonomous and independent law enforcement agency within the government bureaucracy. Finally, the response to the *cultural challenge* entails changes in values and attitudes in the way police interact with the public, and changes in the ways the institution is managed (ie, changing the centralistic, bureaucratic and unaccountable culture of the institution to a culture that is more transparent and integrated, and in which measurable targets and objectives emanating from headquarters are proliferated all the way down to subdistrict stations).

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Against this backdrop the INP–ICITAP team initiated a discussion on the advantages of designing a series of regional pilot projects through which regional police officers, partnering with regionally based civil society organisations, would become both project target populations and project-implementing agents. The partnership approach (police–civil society) was introduced by the author through the

sharing of success stories of such partnerships in community-oriented policing projects both in Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and in three districts in Bangladesh in which he had participated. Police counterparts were enthusiastic about such an approach as it provided a vehicle for building relationships between regional police and local research centres, advocacy groups and universities.

The subsequent challenge was to design a model through which police and civilians could actively engage in a two-pronged process. The first was to gather reliable data at district and subdistrict levels in order to produce a thorough appraisal of the current conditions in selected *polres* and *polsek* stations and their corresponding communities. The second was to use the appraisals to facilitate discussions between police planners and managers. It was hoped that these discussions would generate strategies, priorities and action plans aimed at strengthening *polres* and *polsek* stations and encouraging them to be more responsive to the needs and expectations of the communities they serve. Through this approach the project assisted the Planning Unit at headquarters to develop and standardise more sound and grounded planning strategies and methodologies. It also assisted the INP regional branches (*Poldas*) in the implementation of decree 54/2004 ('Fundamental Guidelines for Fully Autonomous Regional Police'), with the added benefit of active engagement by regional civil society organisations.

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As would be expected, the implementation of the project in the three provinces (South Sulawesi, Bali and East Java) was heavily dependent on the political value that the provincial police leadership would see in developing the project, on the capacity of senior police managers to fully understand the significance of the results and their impact in operational planning, and on the drive of mid- and lower-ranking officers engaged in the police-civil society teams. Implementation was very much personality-driven rather than institutionally led, perhaps reflecting the still dominant trait within the INP of a lack of institutional thinking. The major challenge for implementation at the regional level came from unit commanders at the provincial level (an important part of senior management) close to retirement, who either showed no interest in the results and their possible implications in reshaping the way they conducted business within their respective units, or who simply did not have the skills to understand the significance of the project and the assessment results. It is important to note the difference in the level of engagement of a younger generation of officers in senior regional positions, previously exposed to international environments, who have carved out their careers within less militaristic and bureaucratic frameworks.

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The assessments gathered through the pilot project in South Sulawesi, Bali and East Java generated the first comprehensive reform agenda for the

INP. This led to the development of an inclusive framework through which specific reform efforts could be articulated and to the development of an institutional roadmap from which the INP could prioritise interventions, and break away from donor-driven reform agendas and initiatives. The pilot project also empowered regional police to better implement decree 54/2004 on regional police autonomy. It further empowered regional civil society actors to act as resources for regional police in further developing analysis and policy recommendations under the frame of the regional police autonomy decree (54/2004). Senior police officers determined that the results from the pilot regions were representative of the rest of Indonesia, and encouraged the ITP project to publish in English and Bahasa Indonesia (the national language of Indonesia) a national blueprint for reform.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Indonesian National Police are still far from being a model of democratic policing, but important steps have been slowly made in the corridors of the institution, both in Jakarta and in the regions. With a legal framework in place and a broader political environment conducive to rewarding reform efforts, the ITP was an attempt to concretise a political concept into institutional practice. The ITP established a comprehensive assessment of the current state of regional police entities and shared this with both police and the public through universities and human rights organisations. The assessments

provide reform-oriented police officers, Parliament, parliamentary commissions and key civil society actors with a set of tools and findings that place them in a better position to knowledgeably question government decisions, internal policies and procedures. As a result of ITP, they are also better able to provide alternative analysis and policy options.

The assessments also created tools and internal capacity for a more systematic planning practice. Such a practice will be able to bring together community needs and expectations with the operational, financial and management challenges in district and subdistrict stations. Finally, the assessments produced a set of performance indicators and established benchmarks against which future reformers will be able to judge the success of their efforts. By creating a pool of well-informed stakeholders inside and outside the institution, pressure will mount over time to implement concrete reform initiatives throughout the institution.

Reviewing progress and police reform in Indonesia one year after the ITP concluded produces a mixed picture. The disjunction between the INP headquarters and the new-found dynamism of the INP regional offices is mirrored in an uneven ownership of the ITP assessment tools and methodologies. While the regions have made advancements in both planning and data-gathering as a result of incorporating both ITP assessment findings and planning methodologies, headquarters has failed to take full advantage of the

ITP blueprint as leverage for a less donor-driven reform agenda, and to incorporate the methodologies and findings as tools for planning. Despite the autonomy legislation and the initial efforts to devolve power to the regional police, the top-down, centralised approach to planning and policing, popular at the headquarter levels, has yet to give way to the more evidence-based planning that is slowly developing at the regional levels.

These shortcomings in the INP are not solely the fault of national institutions. In a broad sense, the usefulness of the tool has been undermined by a lack of donor coordination. The police reform agenda in Indonesia is still very much donor-led and heavily permeated by donor foreign interests that are seldom

matched with the most urgent needs of the INP. In addition, as international resources become increasingly available for police reform initiatives in Indonesia (specially after the first Bali bombings in 2002), international interest has grown so rapidly that funds are swiftly allocated and used, thus profoundly compromising the quality of foreign experts who are brought in, as well as the quality of design and relevance of police assistance programmes. Paradoxically, the overflow of cash came from all except the funder of the ITP: the war in Iraq heavily reduced the availability of funding for ICITAP activities worldwide and compromised any follow-up of the ITP after the publication of the national blueprint.